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I. MOUNT TRANSIT AND MOUNT AUTO 
In the United States, we have seen a great struggle play 
out in the twentieth century between what David Jones calls 
mass motorization and mass transit.1 The conflict between cars 
and public transport continues to this day, and has become a 
morality play in the culture wars.2 While the two modes mostly 
serve different markets, at the margins they compete for users, 
                                                          
© 2015 David Levinson 
 *  Editors’ note: A version of this Article is scheduled to appear in a 
forthcoming book by David Levinson. 
 **  Professor and RP Braun/CTS Chair in Transportation, Department of 
Civil, Environmental, and Geo-Engineering, University of Minnesota, dlevin-
son@umn.edu, http://nexus.umn.edu. Parts of this text are adapted and re-
written from posts by David Levinson at TRANSPORTATIONIST, 
http://transportationist.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 1.  DAVID W. JONES, MASS MOTORIZATION AND MASS TRANSIT: AN 
AMERICAN HISTORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Indiana Univ. Press 2010). 
 2. Id. at 97. 
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roadspace, funding, and the hearts and minds of travelers.3 
They are competing on old turf though. As the graph shows, 
both modes appear to be in decline: while transit has been in 
decline for decades, the decline of the conventional auto-
highway-system is just beginning.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Climbing Mount Transit and Mount Auto: The Rise 
and Fall of U.S. Highways5 
 
                                                          
 3. Id. 
 4. JONES, supra note 1, at 181–86. 
 5. The graph shows both linked and unlinked transit trips, as the way 
transit trips are counted has changed, and there is no continuous series of 
both over the entire period. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES 
TO 1970 (1975), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical
_abstract.html; JONES,  supra note 1, at 139; DAVID M. LEVINSON & KEVIN J. 
KRIZEK, PLANNING FOR PLACE AND PLEXUS: METROPOLITAN LAND USE AND 
TRANSPORT 274 (Routledge 2008); Public Road Mileage, Lane-Miles, and 
VMT, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPARTMENT TRANSP., http://www.fhwa
.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2012/vmt422c.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 
2015). 
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 To develop a metaphor Kevin Krizek and I used in 
Planning for Place and Plexus,6 the United States spent from 
the late 1880s through the early 1920s climbing Mount 
Transit.7 Transit was the most important mode of travel (after 
walking) in large and medium-sized U.S. cities.8 The rise of 
transit was enabled by the electric streetcar, itself a product of 
electricity, harnessed by Edison and others,9 and the modern 
railroad, developed beginning in 1825 with Stephenson’s 
steam-powered Stockton and Darlington Railway.10 Transit 
peaked in the United States in the 1920s, but for a spike 
during World War II when oil and rubber were rationed, 
crimping use of the automobile.11 From the end of the War 
forward, transit began a steady decline from which it has not 
really recovered.12 Despite the so-called resurgence of transit, 
and receiving about a quarter of surface transportation 
expenditures,13 transit trips per capita remain below 1990 
levels.14 
The United States spent almost the entire twentieth 
century climbing Mount Auto.15 From the 1920s onward, the 
automobile was the dominant mode of travel for Americans, 
accumulating more miles per capita than other modes.16 While 
the Great Depression slowed the auto’s growth, it did not result 
                                                          
 6. LEVINSON & KRIZEK, supra note 5. 
 7. JONES, supra note 1, at 7, 3146; LEVINSON & KRIZEK, supra note 5. 
 8. JONES, supra note 1, at 53, 55–56. 
 9. Id. at 31. 
 10. See WILLIAM L. GARRISON & DAVID M. LEVINSON, THE 
TRANSPORTATION EXPERIENCE: POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEPLOYMENT 2831 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2014). 
 11. JONES, supra note 1, at 35, 98 (“The peak for total bus, streetcar, and 
rapid transit ridership per capita in a peacetime year occurred in 1926 . . . .”); 
LEVINSON & KRIZEK, supra note 5, at 113. 
 12. JONES, supra note 1, at 9697. 
 13. LEVINSON & KRIZEK, supra note 5, at 4 (“Even in the auto-friendly 
United States more than one in four of all dollars (both federal and state) 
spent on surface transportation has gone to transit in the last 25 years.”). 
 14. JONES, supra note 1, at 139. 
 15. LEVINSON & KRIZEK, supra note 5, at 274; see Public Road Mileage 
Lane-Miles, and VMT, supra note 5 (showing the increase of vehicle 
kilometers of travel per capita during the twentieth century). 
 16. JONES, supra note 1, at 46–48; LEVINSON & KRIZEK, supra note 5, at 
274; see also JEAN-PAUL RODRIGUE ET AL., GEOGRAPHY TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEMS 207 (2013) (“From the 1920s, [automobile] ownership rates increased 
dramatically . . . . Within a short time, the automobile was the dominant mode 
of travel in all cities of North America.”). 
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in decline.17 There was a brief downturn during World War II, 
and a few hiccups in the steady rise of mileage.18 But the later 
2000s and 2010s have seen a sharp downturn in motor vehicle 
use per capita.19 This drop is greater than the drop during 
World War II in absolute terms (though the War saw a drop of 
twenty-three percent off the pre-war peak, and the 2012 drop is 
seven percent below 2005).20 It is complemented by an 
apparent plateauing in total miles of paved roads since 2008.21 
In The Transportation Experience, William Garrison and I 
trace the policy, planning, and deployment of transportation 
technologies across time.22 Both car and transit follow the 
classic lifecycle model or S-curve of birth, growth, maturity, 
and decline.23 The S-curve allows us to mathematically 
approximate the process of growth and decline of 
technologies.24 S-curve growth is in many ways natural. If we 
                                                          
 17. JONES, supra note 1, at 9193, 102. 
 18. These brief slow downs in the inexorable rise in vehicle travel are 
usually attributed to the oil supply and price shocks in 197374 (Yom Kippur 
War), 197981 (Iranian Revolution), the early 1990s (Gulf War), and the early 
2000s (9/11). JONES, supra note 1, at 17376. 
 19. See The Future of Driving: Seeing the Back of the Car, ECONOMIST, 
Sep. 22, 2012, at 29, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21563280 
(discussing the “current fall in car use,” beginning in the early 2000s). 
 20. See JONES, supra note 1, at 102. 
 21. Public Road and Street Mileage in the United States by Type of 
Surface, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., U.S. DEPARTMENT TRANSP., 
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_tra
nsportation_statistics/html/table_01_04.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 22. See generally GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10. 
 23. Id. at 371–74. One hesitates to say “death,” since so few technologies 
actually disappear. For instance, fixed route streetcars are still with us. See 
KEVIN KELLY, WHAT TECHNOLOGY WANTS 56 (Viking Press 2010) (finding 
that no technologies actually vanish, though obviously they diminish in 
importance). 
 24. GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 374–75. The growth curves 
reasonably fit the data for total system size or total system use for a number 
of technologies in retrospect. A collection of such curves, and descriptions of 
the development of the associated technologies can be found at the 
Transportation Deployment Casebook, WIKIBOOKS, https://en.wikibooks.org
/wiki/Transportation_Deployment_Casebook (last updated Oct. 6, 2014), which 
is the result of student projects for a few years in my Transportation Policy 
course. The difficulty is to use such curves in prediction. There are some 
observations though; the left and right sides of the curve (from the inflection 
point, where the rate of growth changes from increasing to decreasing) are 
approximately the same amount of time. Transportation Deployment 
Casebook, supra. So it takes about as long to go from 10% to 50% of the final 
market size as it does to go from 50% to 90% of final market size. See generally 
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start with zero vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) by car per 
capita in 1900, surely the number has to go through 5000 VKT 
before it reaches 10,000 VKT, and 10,000 before 15,000. One 
million people must own a car before two million can. Similarly, 
technologies do not disappear overnight (although transit came 
pretty close).25 Technological deployments are long, gradual 
processes, which occur with many technologies that see growth 
and decline.26 Transportation is among the slowest of these 
technologies, as fixed infrastructure is expensive to build and 
long-lasting.27 
Is the decline in car use permanent, like what happened to 
fixed route transit services in the United States (which is well 
below one-fifth of its previous importance),28 or just a brief 
digression from the steady march of increasing per capita 
vehicle travel that has been following the same drumbeat 
almost continuously from 1910 to 2000?29 
History will tell us for sure, but the evidence for “Peak 
Travel” has been mounting.30 This does not mean there will 
never be a year in which per capita car travel again rises. The 
economy and gas prices still fluctuate, and a boom year with 
                                                          
Transportation Deployment Casebook, supra. A key issue is the determination 
of how large the system will get at its maximum. It depends on the system. 
For instance if we are modeling the number of U.S. states that will adopt some 
policy, the maximum is fifty (unless the United States adds states). If we are 
modeling the percentage of cars that will have some advanced technology, and 
we believe it will become universal, then we can say 100%. But if we are 
modeling a continuous number, rather than a share, it is harder. What is the 
maximum number of kilometers people will travel in a year? What is the 
maximum number of trips? We can make guesses; we can even make informed 
guesses, but we can never know for sure until after the fact. However, if the 
rate of growth has slowed (we are on the right half of the S-curve), we can 
make a much better guess than if growth is increasing at an increasing rate 
(the left half of the S-curve). See GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 
37274 (discussing the S-curve and life-cycles of various modes of transport). 
 25. JONES, supra note 1, at 96–97. 
 26. GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 372. 
 27. Id.; see Angie Schmitt, Why Are American Infrastructure Projects So 
Expensive?, STREETBLOG NETWORK (Aug. 29, 2012), http://streetsblog.net/2012
/08/29/why-are-american-infrastructure-projects-so-expensive/ (discussing the 
high costs associated with transportation infrastructure and how governments 
deal with those costs). 
 28. See JONES, supra note 1, at 139. 
 29. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 30. Adam Millard-Ball & Lee Schipper, Are We Reaching Peak Travel? 
Trends in Passenger Transport in Eight Industrialized Countries, 31 
TRANSPORT REVIEWS 347, 34778 (2011). 
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low gas prices following a recession with high gas prices might 
very well temporarily bump traffic upward, but that is really 
short-term noise. In the absence of external events 
(technological shifts, demographic shifts, social shifts), the 
curve appears to have peaked.31 
But over the longer term, a significant technological shift 
could profoundly change how people use the automobile. If 
there were only one possible significant technological or social 
shift, this might be predictable, but there are numerous 
technological and social shifts in play.32 
While there are many reasons people are not driving more, 
“saturation” satisfies Occam’s Razor. There is only so much 
time in the day. For a worker who spends at least eight hours 
at his or her job and eight hours asleep, how much time is 
reasonable to actually spend traveling as opposed to the other 
things that comprise life? Each additional minute traveling is 
one less minute doing something else. The literature on the 
travel time budget is rich,33 and while people do want some 
separation between their home and work lives, most people do 
not want to spend too much time (say more than ninety 
minutes per day) traveling on a regular basis.34 The travel 
speeds of current technologies limit distance.35 
Similarly, there are a variety of complementary hypotheses 
as to why people are driving less per capita in 2015 than 2000. 
Some of the important ones include: 
                                                          
 31. See id. at 372. 
 32. See JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 18–28 (2014), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR443-1
/RAND_RR443-1.pdf; Sarwant Singh, The 10 Social and Tech Trends That 
Could Shape the Next Decade, FORBES (May 12, 2014, 12:54 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2014/05/12/the-top-10-mega-trends-
of-the-decade/. 
 33. See generally Patricia L. Mokhtarian & Cynthia Chen, TTB or Not 
TTB, That Is the Question: A Review and Analysis of the Empirical Literature 
on Travel Time (and Money) Budgets, 38 TRANSP. RES. PART A 643 (2004). 
 34. Todd Litman, Valuing Transit Service Quality Improvements, 11 J. 
PUB. TRANSP., no. 2, 2008, at 43, 45, available at http://www.nctr.usf.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/JPT11-2Litman.pdf. 
 35. See RODRIGUE ET AL., supra note 16, at 14–15. 
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1.  Price of fuel: higher energy costs diminish travel 
2. Size of the workforce: fewer people working leads to 
fewer work trips (due to both unemployment and labor 
force participation) 
3. Telework: people working at home for the day leads to 
fewer work trips (but more nonwork trips) 
4. Online shopping: buying over the Internet at home 
decreases shop trips 
5. Virtual connectivity: connecting with friends at home 
can substitute for visiting 
The last three reasons for traveling less by car (and overall) are 
due to information and communications technologies 
substituting for travel. But these are all nontransportation 
reasons. 
Obviously different demographic sectors work at home, 
shop online, or connect virtually in different amounts.36 Just as 
your grandparents may still receive a physical issue of the 
newspaper while you read online, your children are more likely 
to be early adopters of future technologies than an older you 
and your parents and grandparents. And the habits formed 
while young may very well persist over time. 
Within the transportation sector there have been small 
shifts over the past fifteen years, which cannot explain much of 
the decline of travel. There are active transportation modes, 
like walking and biking, which work well for short trips, and 
certainly have niches they can grow into if land development 
intensifies and people reorganize their lives to enable them.37 
For instance, I am one of the seven percent of Minneapolitans 
                                                          
 36. PETER J. MATEYKA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HOME-BASED 
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-132.pdf (showing that people from 
certain demographic groups are more likely to work at home). 
 37. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., THE NATIONAL 
BICYCLING AND WALKING STUDY: 15-YEAR STATUS UPDATE (2010), available at 
http://katana.hsrc.unc.edu/cms/downloads/15-year_report.pdf (showing trends 
in pedestrian traffic over a recent fifteen-year period). 
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who walk to work.38 The numbers are much lower outside core 
cities, and nationally, at three percent.39 Transit ridership per 
capita is up ever so slightly.40 
There are a slew of “new mobility options” which use 
information technologies to allow travel without owning an 
automobile, but are not yet visible in the transportation 
statistics.41 These include peer-to-peer taxi and ridesharing 
services and dynamic real-time rental cars. While these are 
useful in their niches, they likely are not cost-effective enough 
to be the main transportation mode for the vast majority of the 
population with the given technology. Today these new mobility 
options are supplements when the main mode does not solve 
the job to be done. In the future, that might change. 
Technologies allow people to do more of the same, and they 
allow people to do new things. It is easier to predict more of the 
same than new things. 
II. MOUNT NEXT 
Autonomous vehicles42 appear to be the next profound 
transportation technology. They bring a series of consequences 
affecting both the transportation sector and the rest of society. 
                                                          
 38. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, MINNEAPOLIS BICYCLE WALKING AND 
COMMUTE DATA 8 (2011), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www
/groups/public/@publicworks/documents/images/wcms1p-104839.pdf. 
 39. AM. CMTY. SERV. REPORTS, COMMUTING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009 
3 (2011), available at www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-15.pdf. 
 40. Press Release, American Public Transportation Association, Record 
10.7 Billion Trips Taken on U.S. Public Transportation in 2013 (Mar. 10, 
2014), available at http://www.apta.com/mediacenter/pressreleases/2014
/Pages/140310_Ridership.aspx (noting the 1.1% gain over the previous year). 
 41. E.g., Katherine Krug, Ditching My Car for Uber Saves Me Over 6 Days 
of Time and $11,000 a Year, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 9, 2015, 1:04 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-using-uber-and-lyft-saves-me-money-201
5-2. 
 42. To describe the new technology, this Article will use the term 
“autonomous vehicle” throughout, which is taken to be synonymous with an 
automated vehicle, robotic vehicle, self-driving vehicle, and driverless vehicle, 
as well as their variants. Just as in the early days of the horseless carriage, it 
is not exactly clear which term will be the linguistic winner. The term 
“vehicle” includes cars, buses and trucks. The term “auto” is used to mean 
automobile rather than autonomous vehicle. In the future, autonomous 
vehicles will probably just be called “cars,” except to differentiate from early 
instances of the technology. 
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A. SAFETY 
Cars, which today kill about 33,000 Americans,43 and 1.2 
million people globally,44 per year, would be much safer if only 
humans were not behind the wheel. We might plausibly 
imagine a reduction to hundreds of deaths per year in the 
United States as we achieve full deployment. 
Autonomous vehicles, powered by sensors, software, 
cartography, and computers, can build a real-time model of the 
dynamic world around them and react appropriately.45 Unlike 
human drivers, they do not get distracted or tired, have almost 
instantaneous perception-reaction times, and know exactly how 
hard to brake or when to swerve.46 
Autonomous vehicle technology is distinct from “connected 
vehicle” technology, which allows individual vehicles to 
communicate with other nearby vehicles (vehicle to vehicle, or 
V2V) and connected infrastructure (V2I) with Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks.47 If widely deployed, this not only improves safety 
for those in the vehicle, it improves the safety and environment 
for pedestrians, bicyclists, and other drivers.48 Connected 
vehicles should enable vehicles to anticipate better and 
negotiate with each other for use of a particular bit of road 
space at a discrete point in time.49 
                                                          
 43. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at xiv; see NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2013 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: 
OVERVIEW 1 (2014), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs
/812101.pdf. 
 44. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON ROAD SAFETY 
2013: SUPPORTING A DECADE OF ACTION 3 (2013), available at 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/83789/1/WHO_NMH_VIP_13.01_eng.
pdf. 
 45. Xi Zou & David Levinson, Vehicle-Based Intersection Management 
with Intelligent Agents 1, 4–5 (ITS Am. Ann. Meeting Proc., 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748611. 
 46. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 59 (“With perfect perception (a 
combination of sensor data gathering and interpretation of those data), AVs 
could plan and act perfectly, achieving ultrareliability. Vehicles never tire; 
their planning algorithms can choose provably optimal behaviors; and their 
execution can be fast and flawless.”). 
 47. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 66–67; Zou & Levinson, supra 
note 45. 
 48. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 16 (explaining that much of the 
benefit of autonomous vehicle technology is “in the form of a positive 
externality to other vehicles, pedestrians, and bicyclists”); Zou & Levinson, 
supra note 45, at 13–14. 
 49. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 67. 
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Both autonomous and connected vehicles are coming. It is 
important to recognize that cars may be autonomous but not 
connected, connected but not autonomous, both, or as today, 
neither.50 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) has a series of levels describing degree of autonomy, 
from Level 0, “no autonomy,” to Level 4, “full self-driving 
automation.”51 Early versions of autonomous cars are 
anticipated for the 2016 Model Year—for example, the Cadillac 
SuperCruise—which may be described as somewhere between 
Level 2 “combined function automation” and Level 3 “limited 
self-driving automation.”52 
The effects of autonomous vehicles are, however, much 
more profound than connected vehicles, as connected vehicles 
are only especially useful in the presence of other connected 
vehicles, while autonomous vehicles are valuable through the 
transition period when most vehicles are not up-to-date. 
As a rough timeline, it is posited in this Article that Level 
3 (“limited self-driving automation”) autonomous vehicles will 
be on the market by 2020, Level 4 will be required in new cars 
by 2030, and required for all cars by 2040 (i.e., human drivers 
will bef generally prohibited on public roads).53 
B. CAPACITY 
Because they are safer, autonomous vehicles can have 
shorter headways.54 They can follow other each other at a 
significantly reduced distance.55 Because they are safer and 
more precise and more predictable, autonomous vehicles can 
                                                          
 50. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 51. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4–5 
(2013), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf
/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf. 
 52. See Ed Oswald, Cadillac Self-Driving Cars: Out by 2015?, PCWORLD 
(Apr. 20, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/254192/cadillac
_self_driving_cars_out_by_2015_.html. 
 53. Id. Once driverless cars become widespread, human drivers will be 
more widely recognized for the hazard they are, and perhaps like smokers, 
will slowly be exiled in time and space. For instance, we may see Sunday 
afternoon Motor-vias, when the old cars, mostly driven by old drivers, make 
their appearance on selected roads. 
 54. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 21. 
 55. Id. 
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stay within much narrower lanes with greater accuracy.56 
Lateral distances can be closer; lanes can be narrower.57 If 
skinny cars emerge (designed for one-passenger, or several 
passengers in tandem) lanes can be narrower still, or be shared 
with two such cars. 
Thus, capacity at bottlenecks should improve, both in 
throughput per lane and the number of lanes per unit road 
width.58 These cars still need to go somewhere, so auto-mobility 
still requires some capacity on city streets as well as freeways, 
but ubiquitous adoption of autonomous vehicles would save 
space on parking, and lane width everywhere. 
It follows that if transportation systems require reduced 
lane width, and have adequate capacity, transportation 
agencies can reduce paved area and still see higher throughput. 
Today, most roadspace is not used most of the time,59 but the 
road agencies cannot just roll it up when it is not being used. 
With autonomous vehicles and better management, unused 
roads still cannot be rolled up. However, on freeways the space 
could be deployed more dynamically to increase either safety 
(by increasing spacing) or capacity (by reducing spacing), 
simultaneously adjusting speed and spacing accordingly. On 
local streets, roadspace no longer needed for movement because 
of added capacity could be reallocated to other uses 
(pedestrians, bicyclists, transit, parks, and so on). 
As a result human travel will be much more point-to-point, 
with far fewer pick-up and drop-off passenger trips required. 
Deadheading autonomous vehicles, driving around without a 
passenger to pick up their next passenger will as a result 
become common, though logistics and shared vehicles can 
minimize the amount of this.60 
                                                          
 56. ALEX FORREST & MUSTAFA KONCA, AUTONOMOUS CARS AND SOCIETY 
13–16, 36–37 (2007), available at https://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Avail
able/E-project-043007-205701/unrestricted/IQPOVP06B1.pdf. 
 57. Id. 
 58. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 21; FORREST & KONCA, supra note 
56. 
 59. See also Tom Vanderbilt, Heading for the Cloud, ITS MAG., Mar. 2011, 
at 10, 11, available at https://www.mobility.siemens.com/mobility/global
/SiteCollectionDocuments/en/news/customer-magazines-and-newsletters/its-
magazine/its-03-11-en.pdf (citing a RAND studying finding that “more than 90 
percent of American roads are not congested 90 percent of the time”). 
 60. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 27. 
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C. AUTO-MOBILITY FOR ALL 
With autonomous vehicles, the transportation 
disadvantaged—children, the physically challenged, and others 
who cannot or should not drive—will be enabled.61 The “parent 
taxi” days will end. 
Parents, friends, and siblings need not shuttle children 
around, the vehicle can do that by itself with Level 4 autonomy. 
The child would be securely identified with camera and in-
vehicle biometrics, and parents could even monitor their child 
with an in-vehicle video camera. This would be far more secure 
than the school buses and carpools children are now using. 
There likely will remain debate about how old a child must be 
before she is placed alone in an autonomous car, but the 
consensus is likely to be, if they are in kindergarten, they can 
ride alone, as with school buses.62 
D. DIVERSITY 
Autonomous vehicles along with sharing may bring about a 
Cambrian explosion63 of new vehicle forms, such as cars 
designed for specific jobs, since they do not need to be 
everything to their owner. For instance, narrow and specialized 
cars are more feasible in a world of autonomous vehicles; the 
fleet will have greater variety, with the right size vehicle 
assigned to a particular job.64 Today there is a car-size arms 
race: people buy larger cars, which are perceived to be safer for 
the occupant, and taller cars, which allow the driver to see in 
front of the car immediately in front of them.65 Both of these 
advantages are largely obviated with autonomous vehicles. The 
car-size arms race ends. 
                                                          
 61. E.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 16–17. 
 62. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 123B.90 (2014) (mandating bus safety training for 
kindergarten to tenth grade riders). 
 63. The Cambrian explosion was a period beginning about 542 million 
years ago when many new animal phyla appeared. Charles R. Marshall, 
Explaining the Cambrian “Explosion” of Animals, 34 ANN. REV. EARTH & 
PLANETARY SCI. 355 (2006). Many different body types evolved and were 
tested for the next twenty million years before the environment settled on the 
forms that became widespread. Id. 
 64. GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 459. 
 65. Michelle J. White, The “Arms Race” on American Roads: The Effect of 
Sport Utility Vehicles and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety, 47 J.L. & ECON. 
333, 333–35 (2004). 
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Evidence for this is already emerging. Google has proposed 
and built prototypes of a new, light, low-speed neighborhood 
vehicle designed for slow speed (twenty-five miles per hour or 
forty kilometers-per-hour) in controlled environments like 
corporate or college campuses.66 The United Kingdom is 
launching four pilot programs.67 Singapore is testing similar 
vehicles.68 The low mass of these vehicles is important as it 
saves energy, but also causes less damage when it accidentally 
hits something or someone.69 Combining the low mass with the 
lower likelihood of a crash at low speed will magnify its safety 
advantage for nonoccupants in this environment compared 
with faster, heavier vehicles (which privilege the safety of the 
vehicle occupants).70 
The Cadillac SuperCruise entrant implies the first market 
for autonomous vehicles would be the relatively controlled 
environment of the freeway.71 However, the relatively 
controlled environment of low-speed places is plausible. These 
are two different types of vehicles (high-speed freeway versus 
low-speed neighborhood), and though they may converge, there 
is no guarantee they will, and perhaps today’s converged 
multipurpose vehicle will instead diverge. 
There has long been discussion of Neighborhood Electric 
Vehicles, ranging from golf carts to something larger, which are 
in use in some communities, particularly southwestern U.S. 
retirement complexes.72 In Sun City, Arizona, for instance, 
                                                          
 66. Chris Urmson, Just Press Go: Designing a Self-Driving Vehicle, 
GOOGLE (May 27, 2014), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/just-press-go-
designing-self-driving.html. 
 67. Driverless Cars Set to Be Tested in Four English Cities, BBC (Dec. 3, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30316458; Stephen Potter, 
Driverless Public Transport Will Change Our Approach to City Planning—and 
Living, CONVERSATION (Dec. 22, 2014), http://theconversation.com/driverless-p
ublic-transport-will-change-our-approach-to-city-planning-and-living-35520. 
 68. Michael Fitzgerald, Singapore Wants a Driverless Version of Uber: 
Singapore Plans to Let Anyone Test Driverless Cars in One of Its Busy 
Neighborhoods in 2015, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/533601/singapore-wants-a-driverless-v
ersion-of-uber/. 
 69. See K. M. Hunter-Zaworski, Impacts of Low-Speed Vehicles on 
Transportation Infrastructure and Safety, 5 J. TRANSP. & LAND USE 68, 72–73 
(2012). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Oswald, supra note 52. 
 72. See generally Hunter-Zaworski, supra note 69. 
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people use the golf cart not just for golfing, but for going to the 
clubhouse or local stores (usually as the household’s second or 
third car, but occasionally as the primary vehicle).73 They can 
do this because local streets are controlled by low speed limits, 
and there are special paths where golf carts are permitted and 
others are not.74 Campuses, retirement communities, 
neighborhoods in some master planned communities, and true 
parkways are almost ideal for these types of vehicles, as they 
discourage fast traffic and do not have high flows. 
To accommodate these low-speed vehicles, most nonideal 
places will likely require retrofits. Retrofitting cities for 
transportation has a long history as cities and transportation 
technologies co-evolve.75 Cities, which had originally emerged 
with human and animal powered transportation, were 
retrofitted first for streetcars, then for the automobile, and in 
some larger cities for subways.76 We have also redesigned our 
taller buildings for escalators and elevators.77 
Some places where retrofits might be required and feasible 
include cities laid out and built before the automobile, where 
much of the street grid can be retrofitted to disallow high-speed 
traffic, in much the same way bicycle boulevards are 
established.78 Similarly, retrofits are technically feasible 
anywhere there is space to retrofit a slow network in parallel 
with the existing fast network, for instance, with barrier 
separated lanes on wider suburban roads.79 
Other designs can be found for other situations. Mixing 
vehicles of different sizes and desired speeds will always 
remain a challenge. Though in many ways mixed traffic is 
transitional until humans are fully taken out of the driving 
                                                          
 73. Philip Haldiman, Sun City Residents Celebrate New Golf-Cart Law, 
AZCENTRAL (Aug. 14, 2014, 11:41 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news
/local/surprise/2014/08/14/golf-carts-rule-roads-sun-city/14095291/. 
 74. Id. 
 75. FENG XIE & DAVID M. LEVINSON, EVOLVING TRANSPORTATION 
NETWORKS 34 (Springer 2011). 
 76. Id. at 34, 66. 
 77. We did not, however, redesign cities for Segways. See Susan A. 
Shaheen & Rachel Finson, Bridging the Last Mile: A Study of the Behavioral, 
Institutional, and Economic Potential of the Segway Human Transporter 
(Transp. Res. Bd.,Working Paper No. 03-4470 2003), available at 
http://tsrc.berkeley.edu/node/622. 
 78. See XIE & LEVINSON, supra note 75, at ch. 4. 
 79. See id. 
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loop, when additional controls can ensure different types of 
vehicles mix safely. 
Vehicle diversity applies not only to a larger variety of 
motorized vehicles of various sizes, but also to a greater variety 
of transportation using the existing streets, which today are 
highly segregated with cars (both moving and parked) 
dominating the street and pedestrians the sidewalk. Slow-
speed, lightweight vehicles make shared spaces, which do not 
differentiate between the road and the sidewalk, much more 
palatable. 
E. VEHICLES-AS-A-SERVICE (VAAS) 
Today, people keep their personal transportation “near 
their person, parking cars and bikes at their homes, 
workplaces, or other destinations.”80 This is the only way to 
“guarantee point to point transportation in a timely way where 
densities were low, incomes high, and taxis scarce.”81 
Information technologies that are today dubbed part of the 
“sharing economy” or “collaborative consumption” permit 
“carsharing”82 and “ridesharing.”83 Coupling these technologies 
with autonomous vehicles allows the creation of “cloud 
commuting.”84 
In this scenario, cars from a giant pool operated by 
organizations based “in the cloud”85 would dispatch a vehicle 
that drives to a customer on demand and in short order, and 
then deliver the customer to her destination (be it work or 
otherwise).86 
                                                          
 80. Vanderbilt, supra note 59. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Carsharing companies active in the United States in 2015 include 
Zipcar and car2go, among others. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 31; 
GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 460. 
 83. “Ridesharing” includes traditional taxis, carpooling, and firms that 
include Uber, Lyft, Gett, Curb, Hailo, Blacklane, Sidecar, Zimride, iHail, and 
Flywheel. Adrienne Jeffries, The Battle Over the Future of the Taxi, VERGE 
(Feb. 8, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/8/3967604/the-batt
le-of-the-taxi-apps. 
 84. GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 460. 
 85. The “cloud” is an early 2000s marketing term referring to computer 
servers located somewhere physically, or maybe multiple places, but nowhere 
you would actually know by logging into their system. See id. 
 86. Id.; Eric Jaffe, Imagine: A World Where Nobody Owns Their Own Car, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/commute/2014/02/imagine-w
orld-where-nobody-owns-their-own-car/8387/. 
802 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:2 
 
The vehicle would have the customer’s preferences 
preloaded, such as seat position, computing interface, and 
audio environment.87 The customer benefits by not tying up her 
capital in vehicles, nor having to worry about maintaining or 
fueling vehicles. The fleet is used more efficiently, each vehicle 
would operate at least two or three times more distance per 
year than current vehicles, so the fleet would turnover faster 
and be more modern.88 
Fewer vehicles overall would be needed at a given time. It 
is likely customers would need to pay for this service either as 
a subscription or a per-use basis. Though advertising might 
offset some costs, surely it would not entirely cover them. 
However, retail stores (if they survive) or employers might 
subsidize transportation, as benefits for the customers or staff. 
VaaS will work better in urban areas than rural areas, as 
the response time will be shorter and size and variety of the 
nearby vehicle pool will be greater.89 It will also work better for 
random trips than work trips, as the regularity of work trips by 
car increases the value of ownership versus renting by the trip. 
Instead perhaps work trips will be made by transit in the 
absence of an owned vehicle. 
An interesting aspect of this from the perspective of travel 
demand is that people will probably pay by the trip (either 
directly, or through choosing the right plan of service roughly 
proportional to use) when using “Shared Autonomous Vehicles” 
(SAVs).90 While the average cost of car ownership, now a quite 
significant share of household expenses,91 goes to zero for those 
who join this system, the out-of-pocket marginal cost per trip 
rises quite significantly.92 The implication is that there will be 
fewer trips once people give up on vehicle ownership.93 People 
                                                          
 87. GARRISON & LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 460. 
 88. See Jaffe, supra note 86. 
 89. Michael Duncan, The Cost Saving Potential of Carsharing in a US 
Context, 38 TRANSP. 363, 365–66 (2011). 
 90. See Jaffe, supra note 86. 
 91. See Duncan, supra note 89, at 364. 
 92. See id. at 365 (“In effect, carsharing can act as travel demand 
management tool. Making the cost of driving more immediate will decrease 
the likelihood of discretionary auto trips . . . .”). 
 93. Id. 
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paying by the minute or the mile will want to reduce trip 
distances.94 
In contrast, if the time cost of traveling per trip declines, 
the theory of induced demand predicts, all else equal: more 
trips, longer trips, and more trips in the peak period.95 Induced 
demand is more likely to apply when people own their 
autonomous vehicle (and thus have paid for the fixed costs 
before the trips, and have a low marginal cost), while reduced 
demand applies when short term out-of-pocket costs rise, as 
expected for those who subscribe to VaaS.96 The share of 
ownership versus VaaS is thus an important predictor of travel 
demand. 
F. MIGRATION 
While VaaS suggests less future driving, there is an 
alternative outcome. Historically, every increase in mobility 
(such as the ability to go faster, either due to new technologies 
or more connected networks) has increased the size of 
metropolitan areas, since people can reach more things in less 
time.97 Subways drove the expansion of London,98 while 
streetcars did the same for many American metropolitan areas 
such as Minneapolis-St. Paul.99 The history of the U.S. 
Interstate Highway System and suburbanization is well 
known.100 The time saved from mobility gains is used mostly in 
                                                          
 94. Id. 
 95. See Robert B. Noland, Relationships Between Highway Capacity and 
Induced Vehicle Travel, 35 TRANSP. RES. PART A 47, 47–48 (2001). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., David Levinson, Density and Dispersion: The Co-
Development of Land Use and Rail in London, 8 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 55, 57 
(2008). Accessibility is usually measured as the number of opportunities that 
can be reached in a given amount of time, for instance, jobs within thirty 
minutes at 7:00 a.m. by transit. See ANDREW OWEN & DAVID LEVINSON, 
ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: TRANSIT 2014 1, 6 (2014), available at 
http://www.its.umn.edu/Publications/ResearchReports/pdfdownloadl.pl?id=250
6, for results from the Accessibility Observatory. 
 98. Levinson, supra note 97, at 73–74. 
 99. Feng Xie & David Levinson, How Streetcars Shaped Suburbanization: 
A Granger Causality Analysis of Land Use and Transit in the Twin Cities, 10 
J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 453, 467–68 (2010) (describing how streetcars led to 
“land development in the Twin Cities”). 
 100. See Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Did Highways Cause Suburbanization?, 
122 Q.J. ECON. 775, 775–76 (2007) (stating that the construction of new 
limited access highways has contributed markedly to central city population 
decline). 
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additional distance between home and workplace, maintaining 
a stable travel time.101 In short: speed decentralizes. 
Autonomous vehicles should be faster than today’s 
vehicles, particularly on freeways, especially after widespread 
deployment when all other vehicles are also autonomous. This 
will occur either once human-operated cars are prohibited from 
freeways or separate lanes are designated for autonomous cars. 
Fully autonomous vehicles also lower the cognitive burden 
on the former driver (now passenger).102 Modes with lower 
cognitive burden tend to have longer trip durations.103 Time is 
important, of course. What you can do with that time (the 
quality of the experience) also matters. If you can work while 
traveling, the value of saving time is less than if you must focus 
on the driving task.104 This may also explain the premium 
people are willing to pay for high quality transit and intercity 
rail service.105 
As acceptable trip distances increase, we would expect a 
greater spread of origins and destinations (pejoratively, 
sprawl), just as commuter trains today enable exurban living or 
living in a different city.106 More people will live in the suburbs 
or exurbs, as the pain of travel reduces.107 This does not mean 
fewer people live in cities, just that as places grow, this will 
tend to encourage people to move out rather than up. 
Similarly, as the cost of travel decreases, people will be 
more willing to live in cities far from where they work. The 
Northeast Corridor of the United States already sees people 
living in one city and commuting to another (for instance from 
Washington to Baltimore, or Baltimore to Wilmington, or 
Wilmington to Philadelphia, or Philadelphia to New York, and 
vice versa).108 At speeds of nearly 100 miles per hour (160 
kilometers-per-hour), the commuting range expands widely.109 
                                                          
 101. See id. (“[F]aster commuting times push up the demand for space in 
suburbs relative to central cities.”). 
 102. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 26. 
 103. Cf. id. 26–27. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Glenn Lyons et al., The Use of Travel Time By Rail 
Passengers in Great Britain, 41 TRANSP. RES. PART A 107, 107–108, 117 
(2007). 
 106. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 26. 
 107. See id. 
 108. NE. CORRIDOR INFRASTRUCTURE & OPERATIONS ADVISORY COMM’N, 
THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 14–17 (2014), 
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For a select few, driverless vehicles may bring back the 
recreational vehicle, as some choose the fully nomadic lifestyle, 
spending much if not most of their lives in motion, especially if 
energy costs are low. 
G. URBAN FORM 
At the more local level, the VaaS model suggests spaces 
now devoted to cars can be repurposed.110 Garages can become 
accessory dwelling units. Gas stations and parking lots and 
structures can see a new higher and better use. Autonomous 
vehicles can drop off their passenger at the front door, and then 
park themselves in far less space than drivers currently require 
(or move on to their next passenger), and that space need not 
be so close to the most valuable urban areas.111 On-street 
parking is not needed at all, one more aspect of roadspace 
reconfiguration that was discussed above.112 
H. COSTS 
At first, the capital costs for autonomous vehicles are likely 
to be higher than traditional cars, as the sensors and 
computers add some cost compared to existing systems.113 
Eventually driver-facing technologies (like the steering wheel, 
brake and accelerator pedals, and so on) can be removed for 
cost savings.114 
Fuel costs on the other hand should be lower, as 
autonomous vehicles are likely to be more efficient, both due to 
less congestion and to more optimized driving styles (ranging 
                                                          
available at http://www.nec-commission.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NEC
_american_economy_report.pdf (describing how the Northeast Corridor 
provides commuters efficient travel between the major cities in the 
Northeastern United States). 
 109. AMTRAK, THE AMTRAK VISION FOR THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR 11 
(2012), available at http://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/453/325/Amtrak-Vision-for-t
he-Northeast-Corridor.pdf. 
 110. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 5, 25–27. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Brad Plumer, Here’s What It Would Take for Self-Driving Cars to 
Catch On, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/23/heres-what-it-would-take-for-self-driving-cars-to-catc
h-on/. 
 114. Id. 
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from smoother acceleration to various hypermiling techniques 
like drafting to reduce drag).115 
Most importantly, for vehicles such as taxis, buses, and 
trucks, which today require a driver, that labor cost can go 
away.116 Labor is a significant share of costs in transportation, 
and that will diminish.117 This lower cost benefits taxis, buses, 
and trucks, which had higher labor costs compared to their 
competitors: cars and trains.118 
Delivery services with online purchasing will become even 
more cost-competitive compared to traditional retail.119 Transit 
will either be more cost effective than it is now, or be able to 
offer lower fares, or some combination of the two. 
I. CLASS120 
Just as owning a car was once a class signifier in the 
United States,121 and remains so elsewhere in the world, and as 
owning a particular model of car persists as a signifier, we can 
expect that during the transition period, owning an 
autonomous car will be a class signifier. It indicates at once 
that you are wealthy enough to own a new car, and 
technologically sophisticated enough to trust your life to it. 
While eventually we expect this to be uniform, early adopters 
will have very different economic and social characteristics 
from the population at large.122 Those who cannot afford such 
cars may come to be vilified as the cause of crashes.123 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
I believe the most important technological changes in 
transportation over the next few decades are those associated 
with autonomous vehicles. Cars that drive themselves change 
how people use them. 
                                                          
 115. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 28–29, 40. 
 116. FORREST & KONCA, supra note 56, at 41–45. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. at 41–42. 
 120. The author thanks Anna Potter here for her ideas. 
 121. JONES, supra note 1, at 127. 
 122. See Jaffe, supra note 86. 
 123. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 39. 
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In the “more of the same” category, we might see more 
travel. Generally, as the cost of travel declines, travel 
increases.124 Since fully driverless cars make it easier to drive 
(by reducing the cognitive burden on the driver), the initial 
effect, assuming people continue to own their cars, would be 
that people would travel farther, to places they are less 
familiar with, and move to places farther from their place of 
work, to get more real estate for the dollar. Today’s commuter 
rail passengers travel farther (and longer) than auto users, and 
autonomous vehicles, where the passenger can do something 
else while traveling, are more like commuter rails than are 
today’s cars.125 Such cars also can deposit drivers in front of 
buildings and park themselves, reducing the amount of time 
that drivers spend parking and accessing and egressing their 
cars,126 which would naturally lead to longer distances. 
Autonomous vehicles are likely to be safe at higher speeds, 
since humans will not be driving, which will also lead to longer 
distances in the same travel time.127 Autonomous vehicles 
expand mobility for those who are now restricted (the young, 
the disabled, and so on).128 
However, such cars also make the so-called new mobility 
options much more useful in cities. Instead of owning a car, 
VaaS (renting on demand) becomes much more viable.129 The 
right-sized car can in principle be summoned at any time. And 
if a driver is paying by the minute when the car is used instead 
of paying for a car loan or lease by the month (whether or not 
she uses it), the incentive structure the driver faces changes.130 
Travel will be less frequent and more thoughtful. The daily 
pattern of transit for routine trips and VaaS for special trips 
becomes feasible. The lack of effective VaaS options now pushes 
people to owning vehicles, and once they own a vehicle, they 
are going to use it. This lifestyle model works in cities, where 
transit can be a mainstay transportation mode, and VaaS are 
conveniently located. 
                                                          
 124. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 102–109. 
 126. See supra notes 60, 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra Part II.A. 
 128. See supra Part II.C. 
 129. See supra Part II.C. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 90–96. 
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It works less well in the suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas, 
where the baseline transportation mode cannot be as expensive 
on a per-trip basis as the VaaS rental model requires, but the 
density is not high enough to support fixed route transit on 
most corridors. 
Obtaining better capital utilization out of our surface 
transportation fleet (like the airlines have achieved with planes 
that are in motion as much as possible) through VaaS will 
reduce the lifespan of cars by using fewer vehicles more 
intensively, and wearing them out sooner.131 Thus, VaaS will 
on average be newer than today’s fleet. As technology continues 
to advance with greater rapidity, this becomes increasingly 
important. The difference between a 2030 and 2020 model 
likely will be far greater than the difference between a 1970 
and 1960 model car. 
These are gradual processes. The rapid change in 
information technology can inform us of the direction of 
changes in transportation, but the pace cannot be replicated. 
The lifespan of a car (upward of twenty years, with a median 
age of 11.4 years) far exceeds that of a smart phone (about two 
or three years), so the technology people possess lags far behind 
the technology that is possible.132 The technologies are 
different. Building roads or rails have socio-spatial implications 
that laying fiber optic cables or constructing cell phone towers 
do not. 
With the emergence of peak travel already, and 
autonomous vehicles just over the horizon, society needs to 
think not about adding road capacity, but maintaining what we 
have and what we need. We also need thinking about strategic 
reductions or rationalizations, or right-sizing. Unfortunately, 
that conversation is not really taking place. 
The mountain analogy implies society cannot climb to the 
peak of the next technology in the same market niche (for 
                                                          
 131. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
 132. Farhad Manjoo, A Wild Idea: Making Our Smartphones Last Longer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/03/13/technology/personaltech/the-radical-concept-of-longevity-in-a-smar
tphone.html (“On average, Americans keep their smartphones for about two 
years . . . .”); Reno Charton American Drivers Keeping Cars on the Road for 
Longer: Average Age Now 11.4 Years, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2013, 11:52 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/reno-charlton/american-drivers-keeping-_
b_3718301.html. 
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instance, serving daily transportation needs) until it climbs 
down the first. One can imagine a technological helicopter or 
zip line, or leaping off the peak (abandoning existing function 
technology, rather than just depreciating it over time) to 
accelerate transformation. Such sudden changes, however, are 
rarely wise and even less politically acceptable, with 
entrenched interests having accumulated power desirous of 
maintaining (or expanding) the status quo. 
If the future of transportation does not involve more 
information technology and more automation, I will be both 
disappointed and surprised. But the exact shape of what comes 
next is hard to say. In the 1980s, we had a vision of a future of 
telecommunications and information that was something like 
what the Internet came to be, all the world’s information at 
your fingertips. But few foresaw that it would be supported by 
online advertising. The idea that a collaboratively-built online 
encyclopedia would displace Britannica and be one of the 
world’s biggest websites, or that an online bookstore (a 
bookstore!) would become the world’s largest online retailer, 
were all unpredicted and unpredictable.133 So it is with 
transportation in the early twenty-first century. 
                                                          
 133. See Caitlin Dewey, Gamergate, Wikipedia and the Limits of ‘Human 
Knowledge,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com
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